Khazabi, Massoud and Quyen, Nguyen (2008): Competition and innovation with horizontal R&D spillovers.
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The paper extends a theoretical framework for analyzing competition and innovation in presence of horizontal spillovers. Introducing two scenarios, it is shown that when firms behave non-cooperatively in both the R&D and production stages the degree of spillover has a negative relationship with the effective and respective R&D expenditures of each firm as well as the level of social welfare. When firms behave cooperatively in the R&D stage, and non-cooperatively in the production stage the relationship between the R&D expenditure of the joint research lab and the number of firms in the market is negative.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Competition and innovation with horizontal R&D spillovers|
|Keywords:||R&D, Spillovers, Cooperation|
|Subjects:||L - Industrial Organization > L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior > L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure|
|Depositing User:||Massoud Khazabi|
|Date Deposited:||14. Jun 2012 22:47|
|Last Modified:||05. Jan 2016 00:23|
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