Litina, Anastasia (2012): Unfavorable land endowment, cooperation, and reversal of fortune.
Preview |
PDF
MPRA_paper_39702.pdf Download (779kB) | Preview |
Abstract
This research advances the hypothesis that reversal of fortunes in the process of economic development can be traced to the effect of natural land productivity on the desirable level of cooperation in the agricultural sector. In early stages of development, unfavorable land endowment enhanced the economic incentive for cooperation in the creation of agricultural infrastructure that could mitigate the adverse effect of the natural environment. Nevertheless, despite the beneficial effects of cooperation on the intensive margin of agriculture, low land productivity countries lagged behind during the agricultural stage of development. However, as cooperation, and its persistent effect on social capital, have become increasingly important in the process of industrialization, the transition from agriculture to industry among unfavorable land endowment economies was expedited, permitting those economies that lagged behind in the agricultural stage of development, to overtake the high land productivity economies in the industrial stage of development. Exploiting exogenous sources of variations in land productivity across countries the research further explores the testable predictions of the theory. It establishes that: (i) reversal of fortunes in the process of development can be traced to variation in natural land productivity across countries. Economies characterized by favorable land endowment dominated the world economy in the agricultural stage of development but were overtaken in the process of industrialization; (ii) lower level of land productivity in the past is associated with higher levels of contemporary social capital; (iii) cooperation, as reflected by agricultural infrastructure, emerged primarily in places were land was not highly productive and collective action could have diminished the adverse effects of the environment and enhance agricultural output.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
---|---|
Original Title: | Unfavorable land endowment, cooperation, and reversal of fortune |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | Land productivity; Cooperation; Social Capital; Economic development; Agriculture; Industrialization |
Subjects: | O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O1 - Economic Development > O11 - Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O4 - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity > O41 - One, Two, and Multisector Growth Models O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O1 - Economic Development > O13 - Agriculture ; Natural Resources ; Energy ; Environment ; Other Primary Products O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O3 - Innovation ; Research and Development ; Technological Change ; Intellectual Property Rights > O33 - Technological Change: Choices and Consequences ; Diffusion Processes O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O5 - Economywide Country Studies > O50 - General O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O1 - Economic Development > O14 - Industrialization ; Manufacturing and Service Industries ; Choice of Technology |
Item ID: | 39702 |
Depositing User: | Anastasia Litina |
Date Deposited: | 27 Jun 2012 23:20 |
Last Modified: | 04 Oct 2019 23:15 |
References: | Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S. and Robinson, J. A. (2005). Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth, in P. Aghion and S. N. Durlauf (eds), Handbook of Economic Growth, Vol. IA, Elsevier North-Holland, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, pp. 385-472. Adams, R. M. (1965). Heartland of Cities, Surveys of Ancient Settlement and Land Use on the Central Floodplain of the Euphrates, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL. Alesina, A., Devleeschauwer, A., Easterly, W., Kurlat, S. and Wacziarg, R. (2003). Fractionalization, Journal of Economic Growth 8(2): 155-194. Algan, Y. and Cahuc, P. (2010). Inherited Trust and Growth, American Economic Review 100(5): 2060-2092. Arrow, K. J. (1972). Gifts and Exchanges, Philosophy and Public Affairs 1(4): 343-362. Ashraf, Q. and Galor, O. (2011a). Dynamics and Stagnation in the Malthusian Epoch, American Economic Review 101(5): 2003-2041. Ashraf, Q. and Galor, O. (2011b). The Out-of-Africa Hypothesis, Human Genetic Diversity, and Comparative Economic Development. NBER Working Paper No. 17216. Ashraf, Q. and Galor, O. (2011c). Cultural Assimilation, Cultural Di¤usion, and the Origin of the Wealth of Nations. NBER Working Paper No. 17640. Bardhan, P. (2000). Irrigation and Cooperation: An Empirical Analysis of 48 Irrigation Communities in South India, Economic Development and Cultural Change 48(4): 847-65. Berg, B. (2007). Volatility, Integration and Grain Banks: Studies in Harvests, Rye Prices and Institutional Development of the Parish Magasins in Sweden in the 18th and 19th Centuries. Stockholm School of Economics. Bisin, A. and Verdier, T. (2001). The Economics of Cultural Transmission and the Dynamics of Preferences, Journal of Economic Theory 97(2): 298-319. Bloch, M. (1966). Land Work in Medieval Europe, Harper and Row, New York. Borjas, G. J. (1992). Ethnic Capital and Intergenerational Mobility, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 107(1): 123-150. Bowles, S. and Gintis, H. (2002). Social Capital and Community Governance, Economic Journal 112(483): 419-436. Boyd, R. and Richerson, P. J. (1985). Culture and the Evolutionary Process, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL. Boyd, R. and Richerson, P. J. (1995). Why Does Culture Increase Human Adaptability?, Ethology and Sociobiology 16(2): 125-143. 77 Butzer, K. W. (1976). Early Hydraulic Civilization in Egypt, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL. Cavalli-Sforza, L. L. and Feldman, M. W. (1981). Cultural Transmission and Evolution: A Quantitative Approach, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. Diamond, J. (1997). Guns, Germs and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies, W. W. Norton & Co., New York, NY. Dohmen, T., Falk, A., Hu¤man, D. and Sunde, U. (2011). The Intergenerational Transmission of Risk and Trust Attitudes, Review of Economic Studies, forthcoming . Durante, R. (2010). Risk, Cooperation and the Economic Origins of Social Trust: An Empirical Investigation. Brown University, Working Paper. Easterly, W. and Levine, R. (1997). Africa.s Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions, Quarterly Journal of Economics 112(4): 1203-1250. Engerman, S. L. and Sokolo¤, K. L. (2000). History Lessons: Institutions, Factor Endowments, and Paths of Development in the New World, Journal of Economic Perspectives 14(3): 217-232. Freydank, K. and Siebert, S. (2008). Towards mapping the extent of irrigation in the last century: a time series of irrigated area per country. Frankfurt Hydrology Paper, Institute of Physical Geography, University of Frankfurt. Gallup, J. L., Sachs, J. D. and Mellinger, A. D. (1999). Geography and Economic Development, International Regional Science Review 22(2): 179-232. Galor, O. (2011). Uni.ed Growth Theory, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. Galor, O. and Moav, O. (2002). Natural Selection and the Origin of Economic growth, Quarterly Journal of Economics 117(4): 1133-1191. Galor, O., Moav, O. and Vollrath, D. (2009). Inequality in Landownership, the Emergence of Human-Capital Promoting Institutions, and the Great Divergence, Review of Economic Studies 76(1): 143-179. Galor, O. andWeil, D. N. (2000). Population, Technology, and Growth: From Malthusian Stagnation to the Demographic Transition and Beyond, American Economic Review 90(4): 806-828. Glaeser, E. L., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F. and Shleifer, A. (2004). Do Institutions Cause Growth?, Journal of Economic Growth 9(3): 271-303. Greif, A. (1993). Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders.Coalition, American Economic Review 83(3): 525-548. Guiso, L., Sapienza, P. and Zingales, L. (2006). Does Culture Affect Economic Outcomes?, Journal of Economic Perspectives 20(2): 23-48. Guiso, L., Sapienza, P. and Zingales, L. (2008). Long Term Persistence. National Bureau of Economic Research. Hall, R. E. and Jones, C. I. (1999). Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output Per Worker Than Others?, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 114(1): 83-116. Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camerer, C., Fehr, E., Gintis, H. and McElreath, R. (2001). In Search of Homo Economicus: Behavioral Experiments in 15 Small-Scale Societies, American Economic Review 91(2): 73-78. Huntington, E. (1915). Civilization and Climate, Yale Univeristy Press, New Haven. Jones, E. L. (1981). The European Miracle: Environments, Economies and Geopolitics in the History of Europe and Asia, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK. Katz, H. A. and Rotter, J. B. (1969). Interpersonal Trust Scores of College Students and Their Parents, Child Development pp. 657-661. Kiszewski, A., Mellinger, A., Spielman, A., Malaney, P., Sachs, S. E. and Sachs, J. (2004). A Global Index Representing the Stability of Malaria, American Journal of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene 70(5): 486-498. Knack, S. and Keefer, P. (1997). Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country Investigation, Quarterly Journal of Economics 112(4): 1251-1288. La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.W. (1997). Trust in large organizations, American Economic Review 87(2): 333-338. La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. W. (1999). The Quality of Government, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 15(1): 222-279. Lagerlöf, N.-P. (2006). The Galor-Weil Model Revisited: A Quantitative Exercise, Review of Economic Dynamics 9(1): 116-142. Landes, D. S. (1998). The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some Are So Rich and Some So Poor, W. W. Norton & Co., New York, NY. Landes, D. S. (2006). Why Europe and the West? Why Not China?, Journal of Economic Perspectives 20(2): 3-22. Lucas, Jr., R. E. (2002). The Industrial Revolution: Past and Future, in R. E. Lucas, Jr. (ed.), Lectures on Economic Growth, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, pp. 109-188. McCloskey, D. J. and Nash, J. (1984). Corn at Interest: The Extent and Cost of Grain Storage in Medieval England, The American Economic Review 74(1): 174-187. McEvedy, C. and Jones, R. (1978). Atlas of World Population History, Penguin Books Ltd., New York, NY. Michalopoulos, S. (2011). The Origins of Ethnolinguistic Diversity. American Economic Review, forthcoming. Mokyr, J. (1990). The Lever of Riches: Technological Creativity and Technological Progress. Myrdal, G. (1968). Asian Drama: An Inquiry Into the Poverty of Nations. Nordhaus, W. D. (2006). Geography and Macroeconomics: New Data and New Findings, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 103(10): 3510-3517. North, D. C. and Thomas, R. P. (1973). The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK. Nunn, N. and Qian, N. (2011). The Potato.s Contribution to Population and Urbanization: Evidence From A Historical Experiment, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 126(2): 593-650. Nunn, N. and Wantchekon, L. (2010). The Slave Trade and the Origins of Mistrust in Africa. American Economic Review, forthcoming. Olsson, O. and Hibbs, Jr., D. A. (2005). Biogeography and Long-Run Economic Development, European Economic Review 49(4): 909-938. Ostrom, E. (2000). Social Capital: A Fad or a Fundamental Concept, Social capital: A Multifaceted Perspective pp. 172-214. Putnam, R. D. (2000). Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community, Simon and Schuster. Putnam, R. D., Leonardi, R. and Nanetti, R. (1993). Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy, Princeton Univeristy Press. Putterman, L. (2008). Agriculture, Diffusion, and Development: Ripple E¤ects of the Neolithic Revolution, Economica 75(300): 729-748. Putterman, L. and Weil, D. N. (2010). Post-1500 Population Flows and the Long-Run Determinants of Economic Growth and Inequality, Quarterly Journal of Economics 125(4): 1627-1682. Ramankutty, N., Foley, J. A., Norman, J. and McSweeney, K. (2002). The Global Distribution of Cultivable Lands: Current Patterns and Sensitivity to Possible Climate Change, Global Ecology and Biogeography 11(5): 377-392. Rodrik, D., Subramanian, A. and Trebbi, F. (2004). Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions Over Geography and Integration in Economic Development, Journal of Economic Growth 9(2): 131-165. Sachs, J. D. and Malaney, P. (2002). The Economic and Social Burden of Malaria, Nature 415(6872): 680.685. Stead, D. (2004). Risk and Risk Management in English Agriculture, c. 1750.1850, The Economic History Review 57(2): 334-361. Tabellini, G. (2008). Presidential Address: Institutions and Culture, Journal of the European Economic Association 6(2-3): 255-294. Uphoff, N. and Wijayaratna, C. M. (2000). Demonstrated Bene.ts From Social Capital: The Productivity of Farmer Organizations in Gal Oya, Sri Lanka, World Development 28(11): 1875-1890. Uslaner, E. M. (2002). The Moral Foundations of Trust, Cambridge University Press. Weber, M. (1905). The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Translated by T. Parsons, and A. Giddens, 1930. Allen & Unwin, London, UK. Weber, M. (1922). The Religion of China: Confucianism and Taoism, Translated and edited by H. H. Gerth, 1951. Free Press, Glencoe, IL |
URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/39702 |