Kohler, Stefan (2012): Envy can promote more equal division in alternating-offer bargaining. Published in: Journal of Neuroscience, Psychology, and Economics , Vol. 1, No. 6 (2013): pp. 31-41.
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Bargainers in an open-ended alternating-offer bargaining situation may perceive envy, a utility loss caused by receiving the smaller share that is modeled in some social preferences in addition to self-interest. I extend Rubinstein (1982)'s original solution of the bargaining problem for two self-interested bargainers to this strategic situation. Bargainers still reach agreement in the first period and their bargaining shares increase in the strength of their own envy. As both bargainers' envy diminishes, the agreed partition converges to the Rubinstein division. If equally patient bargaining parties exhibit similar envy, then the agreed partition is tilted away from the Rubinstein division towards the equal division. Notably, the potential sensation of envy also boosts the share of the eventually envy-free party who leaves the bargaining with the larger share under the agreed partition. This gain in bargaining strength through envy can result in a bargaining outcome that is more unequal than predicted by the Rubinstein division.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Envy can promote more equal division in alternating-offer bargaining|
|Keywords:||alternating offers; bargaining; bargaining power; behavioral economics; envy; equity; fairness; inequality aversion; negotiation; social preferences|
|Subjects:||D - Microeconomics > D0 - General > D03 - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
D - Microeconomics > D6 - Welfare Economics > D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
|Depositing User:||Stefan Kohler|
|Date Deposited:||12. Sep 2012 12:50|
|Last Modified:||09. Jul 2013 19:32|
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