Tian, Guoqiang (2002): Implementation of Walrasian Allocations in Economies with Infinite Dimension Commodity Spaces.

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Abstract
This paper considers the problem of implementing constrained Walrasian allocations for exchange economies with infinitely many commodities and finitely many agents. The mechanism we provide is a feasible and continuous mechanism whose Nash allocations and strong Nash allocations coincide with constrained Walrasian allocations. This mechanism allows not only preferences and initial endowments but also coalition patterns to be privately observed, and it works not only for three or more agents, but also for twoagent economies, and thus it is a unified mechanism which is irrespective of the number of agents.
Item Type:  MPRA Paper 

Original Title:  Implementation of Walrasian Allocations in Economies with Infinite Dimension Commodity Spaces 
Language:  English 
Keywords:  Implementation, Walrasian Allocations, Infinite Dimension Commodity Spaces 
Subjects:  D  Microeconomics > D0  General 
Item ID:  41228 
Depositing User:  Guoqiang Tian 
Date Deposited:  12 Sep 2012 12:54 
Last Modified:  19 May 2016 22:02 
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URI:  https://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/id/eprint/41228 