Duddy, Conal (2012): Condorcet's principle and the strong no-show paradoxes.
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We consider two no-show paradoxes, in which a voter obtains a preferable outcome by abstaining from a vote. One arises when the casting of a ballot that ranks a candidate in first causes that candidate to lose the election. The other arises when a ballot that ranks a candidate in last causes that candidate to win. We show that when there are at least four candidates and when voters may express indifference, every voting rule satisfying Condorcet's principle must generate both of these paradoxes.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Condorcet's principle and the strong no-show paradoxes|
|Keywords:||Condorcet; no show; paradox; abstention; voting; participation; positive involvement; negative involvement|
|Subjects:||D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D71 - Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations
|Depositing User:||Conal Duddy|
|Date Deposited:||24 Sep 2012 16:48|
|Last Modified:||13 Oct 2016 06:48|
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