Theory of Fiscal Federalism: An Analysis

Prakash Chandra, Jha (2012): Theory of Fiscal Federalism: An Analysis.

Abstract

The recent scholarship has made distinction between two generation of literature in fiscal federalism. The study has critically analysed the first generation theory and second generation theory of fiscal federalism. Though the later approaches the problem of fiscal federalism from different perspective, it does not challenge but complements the former. The paper argues that second generation theory is an ongoing effort to build a theory in response to fiscal challenges facing a number of countries. In brief, it is aimed at explaining present-day institutional arrangements which can no longer be adequately explained by employing the first generation theory.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Fiscal Federalism, Decentralisation, First Generation Theory, Second Generation Theory
• Subjects: H - Public Economics > H7 - State and Local Government ; Intergovernmental Relations > H77 - Intergovernmental Relations ; Federalism ; Secession; H - Public Economics > H7 - State and Local Government ; Intergovernmental Relations

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