Halkos, George (2000): Determining optimal air quality standards: Quantities or prices? Published in: Archieves of Economic History , Vol. 2, No. XIV (2002): pp. 61-82.
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In this study, a basic comparison between the Pigouvian and the Coasean approaches is carried out in order to discuss and comment on the mechanisms by which externalities are resolved. Environmental control approaches are examined and compared in terms of minimization of abatement costs, development of new technologies, revenue-generating capacity, complexity, popularity, incentives to cheat and inflation and adjustment costs. It seems that economic instruments have several advantages over regulations: they are less rigid and static, they are cost-effective, provide a source of finance and encourage innovation. However, market mechanisms do not invalidate regulatory approaches; they are, and must be, an adjunct to them.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Determining optimal air quality standards: Quantities or prices?|
|Keywords:||Pollution; Economic instruments; Abatement costs; International cooperation|
|Subjects:||Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics ; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q5 - Environmental Economics > Q50 - General
Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics ; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q5 - Environmental Economics > Q52 - Pollution Control Adoption and Costs ; Distributional Effects ; Employment Effects
Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics ; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q5 - Environmental Economics > Q53 - Air Pollution ; Water Pollution ; Noise ; Hazardous Waste ; Solid Waste ; Recycling
H - Public Economics > H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue > H23 - Externalities ; Redistributive Effects ; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
|Depositing User:||G.E. Halkos|
|Date Deposited:||28 Nov 2012 13:13|
|Last Modified:||25 Feb 2016 11:16|
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