Friedman, Daniel and Singh, Nirvikar (2007): Equilibrium Vengeance.
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Abstract
The efficiency-enhancing role of the vengeance motive is illustrated in a simple social dilemma game in extensive form. Incorporating behavioral noise and observational noise in random interactions in large groups leads to seven continuous families of (short run) Perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE) that involve both vengeful and non-vengeful types. A new long run evolutionary equilibrium concept, Evolutionary Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (EPBE), shrinks the equilibrium set to two points. In one EPBE, only the non-vengeful type survives and there are no mutual gains. In the other EPBE, both types survive and reap mutual gains.
| Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
|---|---|
| Institution: | University of California, Santa Cruz |
| Original Title: | Equilibrium Vengeance |
| Language: | English |
| Keywords: | reciprocity; vengeance; evolutionary perfect Bayesian equilibrium; social dilemmas |
| Subjects: | Z - Other Special Topics > Z1 - Cultural Economics ; Economic Sociology ; Economic Anthropology > Z13 - Economic Sociology ; Economic Anthropology ; Social and Economic Stratification C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; Evolutionary Games ; Repeated Games |
| Item ID: | 4321 |
| Depositing User: | Nirvikar Singh |
| Date Deposited: | 01 Aug 2007 |
| Last Modified: | 28 Sep 2019 04:47 |
| URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/4321 |
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