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Collaborative Dominance: When Doing Unto Others As You Would Have Them Do Unto You Is Reasonable.

Souza, Filipe and Rêgo, Leandro (2012): Collaborative Dominance: When Doing Unto Others As You Would Have Them Do Unto You Is Reasonable.

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Abstract

In this article, we analyze how reasonable it is to play according to some Nash equilibria if players have a preference for one of their opponents’ strategies. For this, we propose the concepts of collaborative dominance and collaborative equilibrium. First we prove that, when the collaborative equilibrium exists it is always efficient, what can be seen as a focal property. Further we argue that a reason for players choosing not to collaborate is if they are focusing in security instead of efficiency, in which case they would prefer to play maximin strategies. This argument allows us to reduce the hall of reasonable equilibria for games where a collaborative equilibrium exists. Finally, we point out that two-player zero-sum games do not have collaborative equilibrium and, moreover, if there exists a strategy profile formed only by collaboratively dominated actions it is a Nash equilibrium in such kind of game.

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