Souza, Filipe and Rêgo, Leandro (2012): Collaborative Dominance: When Doing Unto Others As You Would Have Them Do Unto You Is Reasonable.

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Abstract
In this article, we analyze how reasonable it is to play according to some Nash equilibria if players have a preference for one of their opponents’ strategies. For this, we propose the concepts of collaborative dominance and collaborative equilibrium. First we prove that, when the collaborative equilibrium exists it is always efficient, what can be seen as a focal property. Further we argue that a reason for players choosing not to collaborate is if they are focusing in security instead of efficiency, in which case they would prefer to play maximin strategies. This argument allows us to reduce the hall of reasonable equilibria for games where a collaborative equilibrium exists. Finally, we point out that twoplayer zerosum games do not have collaborative equilibrium and, moreover, if there exists a strategy profile formed only by collaboratively dominated actions it is a Nash equilibrium in such kind of game.
Item Type:  MPRA Paper 

Original Title:  Collaborative Dominance: When Doing Unto Others As You Would Have Them Do Unto You Is Reasonable. 
Language:  English 
Keywords:  Nash Equilibrium; Collaborative Dominance; TwoPlayers ZeroSum Games 
Subjects:  C  Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7  Game Theory and Bargaining Theory 
Item ID:  43408 
Depositing User:  Filipe Souza 
Date Deposited:  24 Dec 2012 14:15 
Last Modified:  26 Sep 2019 10:35 
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URI:  https://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/id/eprint/43408 