A non-cooperative approach to the ordinal Shapley rule

Vidal-Puga, Juan (2013): A non-cooperative approach to the ordinal Shapley rule.

Abstract

In bargaining problems, a rule satisfies ordinal invariance if it does not depend on order-preserving transformations of the agents' utilities. In this paper, a simple non-cooperative game for three agents, based on bilateral offers, is presented. The ordinal Shapley rule arises in subgame perfect equilibrium as the agents have more time to reach an agreement.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: ordinal bargaining; ordinal Shapley rule
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games

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