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A non-cooperative approach to the ordinal Shapley rule

Vidal-Puga, Juan (2013): A non-cooperative approach to the ordinal Shapley rule.

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In bargaining problems, a rule satisfies ordinal invariance if it does not depend on order-preserving transformations of the agents' utilities. In this paper, a simple non-cooperative game for three agents, based on bilateral offers, is presented. The ordinal Shapley rule arises in subgame perfect equilibrium as the agents have more time to reach an agreement.

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