Managerial entrenchment of anti-takeover devices: quasi-experimental evidence from Korea

Hwang, Sunwoo and Kim, Woochan (2011): Managerial entrenchment of anti-takeover devices: quasi-experimental evidence from Korea. Published in: Pacific-Basin Finance Journal No. 22 (2013): pp. 14-36.

Abstract

With the removal of statute-based anti-takeover provisions during the aftermath of Asian crisis, a significant number of Korean firms started to introduce charter-based measures. In this paper, we make use of this unique situation where firm-level anti-takeover provisions (ATP) vary over time (making firm fixed effects regression feasible) and its amendment requires a shareholder approval (making event study feasible), when investigating the link between ATP and firm performance. Using a sample during 1999-2009, we find that firms with charter-based anti-takeover provisions are smaller in size, have lower inside and foreign ownerships, and upon adoption, experience lower share prices, the extent of which drops with inside ownership. Consistent with the overinvestment hypothesis in Jensen (1986), we also find that these firms increase capital expenditure. Our finding also shows that ATP adoptions are followed by lower profitability and lower dividend payouts. Firms with ATPs also experience greater de-listings after the global financial crisis

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Anti-takeover charter provision; Korea; managerial entrenchment
• Subjects: G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G34 - Mergers ; Acquisitions ; Restructuring ; Corporate Governance

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