Colignatus, Thomas (2013): The performance of four possible rules for selecting the Prime Minister after the Dutch Parliamentary elections of September 2012.
Download (224kB) | Preview
Economic policy depends not only on national elections but also on coalition bargaining strategies. In coalition government, minority parties bargain on policy and form a majority coalition, and select a Prime Minister from their mids. In Holland the latter is done conventionally with Plurality, so that the largest party provides the chair of the cabinet. Alternative methods are Condorcet, Borda or Borda Fixed Point. Since the role of the Prime Minister is to be above all parties and represent the nation and to be there for all citizens, it would enhance democracy and likely be optimal if the potential Prime Minister is selected from all parties and at the start of the bargaining process. The performance of the four selection rules is evaluated using the results of the 2012 Dutch Parliamentary elections. The impossibility theorem by Kenneth Arrow (Nobel memorial prize in economics 1972) finds a crucially different interpretation.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Institution:||Thomas Cool Consultancy & Econometrics|
|Original Title:||The performance of four possible rules for selecting the Prime Minister after the Dutch Parliamentary elections of September 2012|
|Keywords:||Political economy; public choice; political science; optimal representation; electoral systems; elections; coalition; impossibility theorem|
|Subjects:||D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D71 - Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C8 - Data Collection and Data Estimation Methodology ; Computer Programs > C88 - Other Computer Software
A - General Economics and Teaching > A2 - Economic Education and Teaching of Economics
|Depositing User:||Thomas Colignatus|
|Date Deposited:||02. Feb 2013 20:53|
|Last Modified:||08. Mar 2015 05:28|
Thomas Colignatus is the preferred name of Thomas Cool in science.
Arrow, K. (1951, 1963), "Social choice and individual values", J. Wiley
BBC (2012), "Eurozone crisis explained", November 27, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-13798000
Colignatus, Th. (2005), "Approval Voting" lacks a sound moral base for the individual voter's choice of approval versus non-approval, especially when the Status Quo is neglected", ewp-get/0503014, March 26 2005, http://thomascool.eu/Papers/SocialWelfare/ApprovalVoting.pdf
Colignatus, Th. (2006), "Application of the Borda Fixed Point voting rule to the Dutch Parliamentary elections 2006", November 23 2006, http://thomascool.eu/Papers/SocialWelfare/BordaFP-DutchElections2006.pdf
Colignatus, Th. (2007, 2011), "Voting Theory for Democracy", 3rd edition, http://thomascool.eu/Papers/VTFD/Index.html. See also http://thomascool.eu/Papers/SocialWelfare/WithoutTimeNoMorality.html.
Colignatus, Th. (2010a), "Single vote multiple seats elections. Didactics of district versus proportional representation, using the examples of the United Kingdom and The Netherlands", May 19 2010, MPRA 22782, http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/22782/.
Colignatus, Th. (2010b), "The performance of four possible rules for selecting the Prime Minister after the Dutch Parliamentary elections of June 2010", MPRA 23240, http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/23240/.
Colignatus, Th. (2011), "Definition & Reality in the General Theory of Political Economy", http://thomascool.eu/Papers/Drgtpe/Index.html
Hond, M. de (2013), "Actuele resultaten politieke voorkeur", https://n7.noties.nl/peil.nl/
Liljedahl, M. (1995), "The Banzhaf index", http://library.wolfram.com/infocenter/MathSource/3592/
Saari, D.G. (2001), "Decisions and elections. Explaining the unexpected", Cambridge University Press
Stokman, F.N., R.C.H. van Oosten, J. Dijkstra, A.P.M. Lucardie (2012), "Kiezers dwingen breed geaccepteerde oplossing af (2012 )", http://www.decide-rug.nl/index.php?title=Kiezers_dwingen_breed_geaccepteerde_oplossing_af_(2012_)