Towards a new theory of economic policy: Continuity and innovation

Acocella, Nicola and Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni (2007): Towards a new theory of economic policy: Continuity and innovation.

Abstract

This paper outlines the evolution of the theory of economic policy from the classical contributions of Frisch, Hansen, Tinbergen and Theil to situations of strategic interaction. Andrew Hughes Hallett has taken an active and relevant part in this evolution, having contributed to both the development and recent rediscovery of the classical theory, with possible relevant applications for model building.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Institution: University of Teramo
• Language: English
• Keywords: policy games; policy effectiveness; controllability; equilibrium existence
• Subjects: A - General Economics and Teaching > A1 - General Economics > A10 - General; E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E0 - General > E00 - General

References

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