Riesgo moral asociado al uso de endeudamiento externo de corto plazo por parte del sector financiero

Leon, Jorge and Monge, Carlos (2010): Riesgo moral asociado al uso de endeudamiento externo de corto plazo por parte del sector financiero.

Abstract

This paper addresses the issue of moral hazard associated with the use of short-term foreign borrowing by the financial intermediaries in Costa Rica. This situation arises from the implicit insurance that the authorities confer; given the expectation that banks have about central bank incentives to intervene to prevent the fail of any systemically important financial institution (SIFI). Using a simple mathematical-economic model, this paper analyzes several factors involved in this phenomenon and suggests policy measures that could provide a solution to the problem.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• English Title: Moral Hazard associated with the use of short-term foreign borrowing by the financial intermediaries in Costa Rica
• Language: Spanish
• Keywords: moral hazard, borrowing, sistemic risk
• Subjects: E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E5 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit > E58 - Central Banks and Their Policies; G - Financial Economics > G2 - Financial Institutions and Services > G21 - Banks ; Depository Institutions ; Micro Finance Institutions ; Mortgages

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