Confirming Information Flows in Networks

Billand, Pascal and Bravard, Christophe and Kamphorst, Jurjen J.A. and Sarangi, Sudipta (2013): Confirming Information Flows in Networks.

Abstract

Social networks, be it on the internet or in real life, facilitate information flows. We model this by giving agents incentives to link with others and receive information through those links. We consider networks where agents have an incentive to confirm the information they receive from others. Our paper analyzes the social networks that are formed. We first study the existence of Nash equilibria and then characterize the set of strict Nash networks. Next, we characterize the set of strictly efficient networks and discuss the relationship between strictly efficient networks and strict Nash networks. Finally, we check the robustness of our results by allowing for heterogeneity among agents, possibility of bilateral deviations of agents, and decay in the network.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: connections model, confirmation, two-way flow models.
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D85 - Network Formation and Analysis: Theory

References

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