Jung, Hanjoon Michael (2007): Spatial Pillage Game.
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Abstract
A pillage game is a coalitional game that is meant to be a model of Hobbesian anarchy. The spatial pillage game introduces a spatial feature into the pillage game by assuming that players are located in regions. Players can travel from one region to another in one move and can form a coalition and combine their power only with players in the same region. A coalition has power only within its region. Under this spatial restriction, some members of a coalition can pillage less powerful coalitions without any cost. The feasibility of pillages between coalitions determines the dominance relation. Core, stable set, and farsighted core are adopted as alternative solution concepts.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Institution: | Lahore University of Management Sciences |
Original Title: | Spatial Pillage Game |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | allocation by force; coalitional games; pillage game; spatial restriction; stable set; farsighted core |
Subjects: | C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C71 - Cooperative Games R - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics > R1 - General Regional Economics > R19 - Other |
Item ID: | 4651 |
Depositing User: | Hanjoon Michael Jung |
Date Deposited: | 31 Aug 2007 |
Last Modified: | 02 Oct 2019 04:37 |
References: | 1.J. Hirshleifer, Anarchy and its breakdown, J. Polit. Economy 103, 1995, 26-52. 2.J. Hirshleifer, The paradox of power, Econ. Politics 3, 1991, 177-200. 3.J. Jordan, Pillage and Property, J. Econ. Theory, 2005, forthcoming. 4.K. Konrad and S. Skaperdas, Extortion, Economica 65, 1998, 461-77. 5.W. Lucas,Von Neumann--Morgenstern stable sets, in: R. Aumann, S. Hart (Eds.), Handbook of Game Theory, Elsevier, Amsterdam, 1992, 543-90. 6.A. Muthoo, A model of the origins of basic property rights, Games Econ. Behav. 3, 1991, 177-200 7.M. Piccione and A. Rubinstein, Equilibrium in the jungle, 2006, mimeo. 8.A. Roth, Subsolutions and the supercore of cooperative games, Math. Operations Res. 1, 1976, 43-49. 9.S. Skaperdas, Cooperation, conflict and power in the absence of property rights, Amer. Econ. Rev. 82, 1992, 720-739. |
URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/4651 |
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