Munich Personal RePEc Archive

An Experimental Investigation of Colonel Blotto Games

Chowdhury, Subhasish and Kovenock, Dan and Sheremeta, Roman (2011): An Experimental Investigation of Colonel Blotto Games. Published in: Economic Theory No. 52 (2013): pp. 833-861.

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This article examines behavior in the two-player, constant-sum Colonel Blotto game with asymmetric resources in which players maximize the expected number of battlefields won. The experimental results support the main qualitative predictions of the theory. In the auction treatment, where winning a battlefield is deterministic, disadvantaged players use a “guerilla warfare” strategy which stochastically allocates zero resources to a subset of battlefields. Advantaged players employ a “stochastic complete coverage” strategy, allocating random, but positive, resource levels across the battlefields. In the lottery treatment, where winning a battlefield is probabilistic, both players divide their resources equally across all battlefields. However, we also find interesting behavioral deviations from the theory and discuss their implications.

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