On pure strategy equilibria in large generalized games

Riascos Villegas, Alvaro and Torres-Martínez, Juan Pablo (2013): On pure strategy equilibria in large generalized games.

Abstract

We consider a game with a continuum of players where at most a finite number of them are atomic. Objective functions are continuous and admissible strategies may depend on the actions chosen by atomic players and on aggregate information about the actions chosen by non-atomic players. When atomic players have convex sets of admissible strategies and quasi-concave objective functions, a pure strategy Nash equilibria always exists.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Generalized games; Non-convexities; Pure-strategy Nash equilibrium
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C6 - Mathematical Methods ; Programming Models ; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling > C62 - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium

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