Renégociation stratégique de la dette, risque comptable et risque juridique

Chopard, Bertrand and Langlais, Eric (2007): Renégociation stratégique de la dette, risque comptable et risque juridique.

Abstract

This paper studies the influence of bankruptcy law (depending on whether the law is pro-lenders or pro-borrowers) on the borrowers propensity to demand the renegotiation of their debt, when there exist an asymmetrical information between lenders and borrowers. In the tradition of Law & Economics, we proceed to a study of impact for the main parameters of the model that capture the design of bankruptcy law, showing their influence on the probability of strategic bankruptcy and on the social welfare.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Institution: Nancy University
• English Title: Strategic Bankruptcy with accountable and judicial risks
• Language: French
• Keywords: bankruptcy law; strategic debt repudiation; judicial risk and debt renegotiation
• Subjects: K - Law and Economics > K0 - General; G - Financial Economics > G0 - General; G - Financial Economics > G2 - Financial Institutions and Services > G21 - Banks ; Depository Institutions ; Micro Finance Institutions ; Mortgages; G - Financial Economics > G2 - Financial Institutions and Services > G20 - General; K - Law and Economics > K3 - Other Substantive Areas of Law > K35 - Personal Bankruptcy Law; K - Law and Economics > K2 - Regulation and Business Law; G - Financial Economics > G2 - Financial Institutions and Services > G29 - Other

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