Skill Diversity and Leadership in Team Production

Hattori, Keisuke and Yamada, Mai (2013): Skill Diversity and Leadership in Team Production.

Abstract

Using a team-production model with heterogeneous workers, we examine the short- and long-run efficiency effects of skill diversity and leadership in teams. Our analysis focuses on workers' strategic incentives to manipulate their skills. In the short run, heterogeneous pairing (pairing workers with different skills) yields a greater total production than homogeneous pairing. However, in the long run, homogeneous paring may yield a greater total production because of gradual improvements in workers' skill. We also show new potential benefits of leadership: assigning a leader to a team yields a smaller total production in the short run, but, a greater production in the long run by preventing workers from consistently reducing their skills.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Team production; Voluntary provision of public goods; Leadership; Efficient role assignment; Team-building
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D2 - Production and Organizations > D21 - Firm Behavior: Theory; H - Public Economics > H4 - Publicly Provided Goods > H41 - Public Goods; M - Business Administration and Business Economics ; Marketing ; Accounting ; Personnel Economics > M5 - Personnel Economics > M54 - Labor Management

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