Eficacia y asimetrías de los programas de delación en un contexto multi-mercado: un análisis del caso colombiano en el marco del TLC con Estados Unidos

Sánchez Navarro, Dennis (2013): Eficacia y asimetrías de los programas de delación en un contexto multi-mercado: un análisis del caso colombiano en el marco del TLC con Estados Unidos.

Abstract

This paper analyzes the possible effects of asymmetries in the leniency programs on anti-competitive behavior of agents in multi-market context. In particular, this paper analyzes the Colombian leniency program and compares it with the United States program to identify possible differences between them that could affect the effectiveness of the leniency policy.

El presente documento busca analizar los posibles efectos de las asimetrías en los programas de delación en diversas jurisdicciones territoriales sobre el comportamiento anticompetitivo de los agentes en un contexto multi-mercado. En particular, este trabajo analiza el programa de delación de Colombia y lo contrasta con el de Estados Unidos para identificar posibles diferencias entre ellos que pudieran incidir en la efectividad de la política de delación.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• English Title: Efficacy and asymmetries of the leniency programs on a multi-market context: an analysis of the Colombian case under the FTA with the U.S.
• Language: Spanish
• Keywords: D29, D43, D79.
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D2 - Production and Organizations > D29 - Other; D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection; D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D79 - Other

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