Objectif de Lutte contre l’Inflation et Croissance Economique en Afrique: la Nécessité d’une Alternative

NGUENA, Christian L. (2012): Objectif de Lutte contre l’Inflation et Croissance Economique en Afrique: la Nécessité d’une Alternative.

Abstract

G3 Recent pronouncements as financial crisis management solution for the activity have put into question the orthodox monetarist in implementing monetary policy. In this sense, the Central Bank could be a victim of its own success by the paradox of credibility. The theory of divine coincidence which says that, only by stabilizing inflation the monetary authority also stabilizes the economy without being a target, does not seem applicable in practice. This critique of inflation targeting strategy is updating the controversy surrounding the role of Central Bank in Africa economic activity. In African economies, characterized by the heterogeneity of economies, low integration, public intervention, corruption, virtual absence of financial markets and lack of innovation and competitiveness, based the conduct of monetary policy on the single objective of price stability becomes questionable. In addition, proponents of price stability supported that by stabilizing prices, economic growth would be stimulated. In recent years, monetary authorities in poor countries have focused on preventive measures and successfully control inflation which reaches in most cases around 2 percent. They are provided as credibility and a certain prestige in public opinion. Paradoxically, however, growth has not followed. This makes it important to know if we should still believe in a goal that does not play its role. In this zone, we note low growth rate merged with controllable inflation rate, sign of efficiency and credibility. This work is proposing to come out with the impact of the search for a greater credibility by Africa countries central bank on economic growth. The theoretical econometric model used is an endogenous growth model derives from Solow model. From this model, the utilization of simple and panel’s econometric method to proceed for the estimation of growth equation has been adopted. The estimation based on African countries data from FMI on 1975-2015 periods and World Bank and Central African State Bank data covering CEMAC zone and 1980 – 2008 periods leads to a contrary result regarding the previous study hypothesis; According to that hypothesis monetary policy credibility in terms of fight against inflation may have a positive impact on economic growth. This leads to recommend a monetary policy geared towards the amelioration of CEMAC zone economic growth with the constraint of inflation objective as proposal of Central Bank model which will provide leverage for CEMAC zone economies sustainable growth and healthy development.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• English Title: Fighting against Inflation and economic growth in Africa: A necessity of alternative
• Language: French
• Keywords: Panel data econometrics; Price stability; Monetary Policy Credibility; Economic Growth.
• Subjects: E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E3 - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles > E31 - Price Level ; Inflation ; Deflation; E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E5 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit > E52 - Monetary Policy; E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E5 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit > E58 - Central Banks and Their Policies; E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E6 - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook > E61 - Policy Objectives ; Policy Designs and Consistency ; Policy Coordination

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