Median voter model cannot solve all the problems of voting system

Islam, Jamal and Mohajan, Haradhan and Moolio, Pahlaj (2010): Median voter model cannot solve all the problems of voting system. Published in: International Journal of Economics and Research , Vol. 2, No. 6 (31 December 2011): pp. 111-125.

Abstract

The median voter theorem is one of the most prominent results of formal political theory and economics, and is widely used to study interactions between them. The median voter is the person in the middle of the distribution on the single dimension and is a more accurate predictor of decision outcomes under simple majority voting system. Politicians believe that elections are logically imperfect. Median voting model has such imperfections less than the other models and an attempt has been taken to explore these in some details. Although the median voting model plays a pioneer role in modern democracy but it can not solve all the problems of voting system, and the paper deals where the median voter theorem fails.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Median voter, Single-peakedness, Single-crossing and Top monotonicity.
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C3 - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models ; Multiple Variables

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