Mohajan, Haradhan (2011): Social welfare and social choice in different individuals’ preferences. Published in: International Journal of Human Development and Sustainability , Vol. 5, No. 1 (30 June 2012): pp. 11-22.
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Abstract
This paper discusses both social welfare and social choice using Arrow’s impossibility theorem for multi-profile preference case and two versions of it for single-profile preference case. Between these two versions first one assumes a two-individual society and the second one, which is similar to a theorem of Pollak, assuming two or more individuals. In single-profile version decisiveness, simple and complex diversity must occur. This paper considers a special case of Arrow’s theorem, namely single-profile preference. Diversity and decisiveness of preferences are discussed for two individuals and more than two individuals in a society.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | Social welfare and social choice in different individuals’ preferences |
English Title: | Social welfare and social choice in different individuals’ preferences |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | Single-profile preference, Social welfare, Pollak diversity, Dictator. |
Subjects: | I - Health, Education, and Welfare > I3 - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty > I31 - General Welfare, Well-Being |
Item ID: | 50851 |
Depositing User: | Haradhan Kumar Mohajan |
Date Deposited: | 22 Oct 2013 06:28 |
Last Modified: | 30 Sep 2019 04:07 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/50851 |