Munich Personal RePEc Archive

Social welfare and social choice in different individuals’ preferences

Mohajan, Haradhan (2011): Social welfare and social choice in different individuals’ preferences. Published in: International Journal of Human Development and Sustainability , Vol. 5, No. 1 (30 June 2012): pp. 11-22.

[thumbnail of MPRA_paper_50851.pdf]

Download (143kB) | Preview


This paper discusses both social welfare and social choice using Arrow’s impossibility theorem for multi-profile preference case and two versions of it for single-profile preference case. Between these two versions first one assumes a two-individual society and the second one, which is similar to a theorem of Pollak, assuming two or more individuals. In single-profile version decisiveness, simple and complex diversity must occur. This paper considers a special case of Arrow’s theorem, namely single-profile preference. Diversity and decisiveness of preferences are discussed for two individuals and more than two individuals in a society.

Atom RSS 1.0 RSS 2.0

Contact us: mpra@ub.uni-muenchen.de

This repository has been built using EPrints software.

MPRA is a RePEc service hosted by Logo of the University Library LMU Munich.