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A generalized Tullock contest

Sheremeta, Roman and Chowdhury, Subhasish (2010): A generalized Tullock contest. Published in: Public Choice

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Abstract

We construct a generalized Tullock contest under complete information where contingent upon winning or losing, the payoff of a player is a linear function of prizes, own effort, and the effort of the rival. This structure nests a number of existing contests in the literature and can be used to analyze new types of contests. We characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium and show that small parameter modifications may lead to substantially different types of contests and hence different equilibrium effort levels.

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