O Poder das Alianças no Congresso Nacional Brasileiro: Votação de Vetos Presidenciais e de Emendas Constitucionais

Masili, Gustavo (2013): O Poder das Alianças no Congresso Nacional Brasileiro: Votação de Vetos Presidenciais e de Emendas Constitucionais.

Abstract

For any political party wishing to keep the governance of the country, it is crucial to understand the power that each of the other parties can bring to its coalition. This evaluation helps to understand the bargaining power of each party individually. Furthermore, it allows a party to evaluate alternative alliances that may require less counterparts and that offers more power. This paper presents the historical evolution of the theory of voting power and an analysis of the voting power of each of the Brazilian parties, as well as some strategic alliances, for both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• English Title: The Power of Alliances in the Brazilian National Congress: Vote on Presidential Vetoes and Constitutional Amendments
• Language: Portuguese
• Keywords: Voting Power, Political Parties, Alliances; Legislative Behavior.
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games; D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior; D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D74 - Conflict ; Conflict Resolution ; Alliances ; Revolutions

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