Good Practices in Corporate Governance: One-Size-Fits-All vs. Comply-or-Explain

Nedelchev, Miroslav (2013): Good Practices in Corporate Governance: One-Size-Fits-All vs. Comply-or-Explain. Published in: International Journal of Business Administration , Vol. 4, No. 6 (8 November 2013): pp. 75-81.

Abstract

There are many studies exploring the effects of hard and soft legislation on good practices. Few studies examine the strengths and weaknesses of particular legislation. These mainly focus on positive results of legislation and justify the application of existing approach for better practices. The study compares the approaches of hard and soft legislation. It finds that both approaches are suitable for implementation despite of state policy. The analysis is developed by using the practices of several countries for latest 20 years. This study explored national legislation and its effects on good practices in corporate governance. It revealed that there was no significant difference between state policy and approaches, and between legislation and corporate governance practices. The objective of the study is to develop deeper insight into pros and cons adoptation of approaches. Comparative analysis shows that state policy determines the good practices. Moreover, the conclusion point out that there is a small freedom of action for companies to attract investors.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: good practices, corporate governance
• Subjects: G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G34 - Mergers ; Acquisitions ; Restructuring ; Corporate Governance

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