Munich Personal RePEc Archive

Pay What You Want – But Pay Enough! Information Asymmetries and PWYW Pricing

Greiff, Matthias and Egbert, Henrik and Xhangolli, Kreshnik (2013): Pay What You Want – But Pay Enough! Information Asymmetries and PWYW Pricing.

This is the latest version of this item.

[img]
Preview
PDF
MPRA_paper_52358.pdf

Download (213kB) | Preview

Abstract

Pay What You Want (PWYW) pricing has received considerable attention recently. Empirical studies show that when PWYW pricing is implemented buyers do not behave selfishly in a number of cases and that some sellers are able to use PWYW to increase turnover as well as profits. In this paper we present a theoretical model of buyer behavior under asymmetric information about production costs. Our model shows that information asymmetries provide an explanation for the results found in empirical studies.

Available Versions of this Item

  • Pay What You Want – But Pay Enough! Information Asymmetries and PWYW Pricing. (deposited 07 Jan 2014 16:20) [Currently Displayed]
UB_LMU-Logo
MPRA is a RePEc service hosted by
the Munich University Library in Germany.