Breitmoser, Yves and Tan, Jonathan H.W. (2014): Reference Dependent Altruism.

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Abstract
In view of behavioral patterns left unorganized by current social preference theories, we propose a theory of reference dependent altruism (RDA). With RDA, one's degree of altruism increases at reference points. It induces equity and efficiency effects that are conditional on whether or not payoffs meet reference points. We verify the theory first by experimentally analyzing majority bargaining, where observed behavior contradicts existing theories but confirms RDA. Using parameter estimates from majority bargaining, we then make outofsample predictions for CharnessRabin, EngelmannStrobel, and BoltonOckenfels games. RDA organizes these seemingly disparate games outofsample, which validates our hypothesis that prosocial behavior primarily relates to reference points.
Item Type:  MPRA Paper 

Original Title:  Reference Dependent Altruism 
Language:  English 
Keywords:  bargaining, noncooperative game, laboratory experiment, social preferences, quantal response equilibrium 
Subjects:  C  Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7  Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72  Noncooperative Games C  Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7  Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C78  Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory D  Microeconomics > D7  Analysis of Collective DecisionMaking > D72  Political Processes: RentSeeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior 
Item ID:  52774 
Depositing User:  Yves Breitmoser 
Date Deposited:  07 Jan 2014 16:17 
Last Modified:  28 Sep 2019 18:34 
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URI:  https://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/id/eprint/52774 