Language, Meaning, and Games: A Model of Communication, Coordination, and Evolution: Comment

Heller, Yuval (2013): Language, Meaning, and Games: A Model of Communication, Coordination, and Evolution: Comment. Forthcoming in: American Economic Review No. forthcoming

Abstract

Demichelis and Weibull (2008 AER) show that adding lexicographic lying costs to coordination games with cheap talk yields a sharp prediction: only the efficient outcome is evolutionarily stable. I show that this result is caused by the discontinuity of preferences rather than by small lying costs per se. Finally, I discuss why discontinuity may not be an appealing assumption in evolutionary models.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Lexicographic preferences, evolutionary stability, cheap talk.
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; Evolutionary Games ; Repeated Games

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