Heller, Yuval (2013): Stability and trembles in extensive-form games. Forthcoming in: Games and Economic Behaivor No. forthcoming
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Abstract
A leading solution concept in the evolutionary study of extensive-form games is Selten's (1983) (selten1983evolutionary) notion of limit ESS. We demonstrate that a limit ESS does not imply neutral stability, and that it may be dynamically unstable (almost any small perturbation takes the population away). These problems arise due to an implicit assumption that “mutants” are arbitrarily rare relative to “trembling” incumbents. Finally, we present a novel definition that solves this issue and has appealing properties.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | Stability and trembles in extensive-form games |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | Limit ESS, evolutionary stability, extensive-form games. |
Subjects: | C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; Evolutionary Games ; Repeated Games |
Item ID: | 53387 |
Depositing User: | Yuval Heller |
Date Deposited: | 04 Feb 2014 17:51 |
Last Modified: | 05 Oct 2019 16:36 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/53387 |
Available Versions of this Item
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Stability and trembles in extensive-form games. (deposited 01 Aug 2013 15:27)
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Stability and trembles in extensive-form games. (deposited 02 Oct 2013 11:03)
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Stability and trembles in extensive-form games. (deposited 02 Oct 2013 18:38)
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Stability and trembles in extensive-form games. (deposited 31 Oct 2013 02:01)
- Stability and trembles in extensive-form games. (deposited 04 Feb 2014 17:51) [Currently Displayed]
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Stability and trembles in extensive-form games. (deposited 31 Oct 2013 02:01)
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Stability and trembles in extensive-form games. (deposited 02 Oct 2013 18:38)
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Stability and trembles in extensive-form games. (deposited 02 Oct 2013 11:03)