Hashimoto, Tadashi (2007): A corrigendum to "Games with imperfectly observable actions in continuous time".
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Abstract
Sannikov (2007) investigates properties of perfect public equilibria in continuous time repeated games. This note points out that the proof of the main theorem (Theorem 2) needs some corrections. I show that the main theorem holds as it is with suitable modifications of Lemmata 5 and 6.
| Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
|---|---|
| Institution: | The University of Tokyo |
| Original Title: | A corrigendum to "Games with imperfectly observable actions in continuous time" |
| Language: | English |
| Keywords: | repeated games; continuous time |
| Subjects: | C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; Evolutionary Games ; Repeated Games C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games |
| Item ID: | 5398 |
| Depositing User: | Tadashi Hashimoto |
| Date Deposited: | 22 Oct 2007 |
| Last Modified: | 30 Sep 2019 17:21 |
| References: | Sannikov, Y. (2007): ``Games with Imperfectly Observable Actions in Continuous Time," Econometrica, 75, 1285-1329. |
| URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/5398 |
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