Branding and Collusion in Vertically Differentiated Industries

Garcia, Daniel (2014): Branding and Collusion in Vertically Differentiated Industries.

Abstract

This paper presents a model of collusion in vertically differentiated industries where firms have the option to make their products distinguishable to consumers by attaching a brand. We show that if consumers’ preferences are linear in the quality dimension and their beliefs satisfy a standard refinement, collusion is facilitated in the absence of brands. More precisely, we show that if collusion is feasible with brands it is also feasible without them

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Collusion; Branding; Vertical Differentiation
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D83 - Search ; Learning ; Information and Knowledge ; Communication ; Belief ; Unawareness; L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets; L - Industrial Organization > L4 - Antitrust Issues and Policies > L40 - General

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