Central bank independence, policies and reforms: addressing political and economic linkages

Marianne, Ojo (2014): Central bank independence, policies and reforms: addressing political and economic linkages.

Abstract

Whilst economic, political linkages and relationships constitute the theme of this paper, the paper also attempts to address why central bank independence still lacks certain vital attributes which embody adequate governance and accountability mechanisms - which are necessary if better results in relation to longer term economic and political objectives, in particular, are to be achieved.

From this perspective, the growing importance of the shift to a focus on distinguishing between micro and macro prudential regulation is illustrated. The need for such distinction is not just evidenced through the creation of agencies responsible for such affairs within particular jurisdictions which are considered in this paper, but also through the increased realisation and need for greater focus on decision making responsibilities which are to be assigned to political and economic entities at supra national levels.

Financial stability, it appears, has more to do with a mere focus on longer term objectives. Financial stability is also concerned with the ability to sustain long term policy objectives whilst being flexible enough to respond effectively to short term unpredictabilities.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: inflation targeting; monetary policies; central banks; fiscal policies; accountability; governance arrangements; momentum effects
• Subjects: E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E2 - Consumption, Saving, Production, Investment, Labor Markets, and Informal Economy; E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E5 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit; G - Financial Economics > G2 - Financial Institutions and Services; K - Law and Economics > K2 - Regulation and Business Law

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