Munich Personal RePEc Archive

Categorization and correlation in a random-matching game

Azrieli, Yaron (2007): Categorization and correlation in a random-matching game.

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We consider a random-matching model in which every agent has a categorization (partition) of his potential opponents. In equilibrium, the strategy of each player is a best response to the distribution of actions of his opponents in each category of his categorization. We provide equivalence theorems between distributions generated by equilibrium profiles and correlated equilibria of the underlying game.

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