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Strong equilibrium in games with common and complementary local utilities

Kukushkin, Nikolai S. (2014): Strong equilibrium in games with common and complementary local utilities.

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Abstract

A rather general class of strategic games is described where the coalition improvements are acyclic and hence strong equilibria exist: The players derive their utilities from the use of certain "facilities"; all players using a facility extract the same amount of "local utility" therefrom, which amount depends both on the set of users and on their actions, and is decreasing in the set of users; the "ultimate" utility of each player is the minimum of the local utilities at all relevant facilities. Two important subclasses are "games with structured utilities," basic properties of which were discovered in 1970s and 1980s, and "bottleneck congestion games," which attracted researchers' attention quite recently. The former games are representative in the sense that every game from the whole class is isomorphic to one of them. The necessity of the minimum aggregation for the "persistent" existence of strong equilibria, actually, just Pareto optimal Nash equilibria, is established.

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