Osorio, Antonio (2014): A Sequential Allocation Problem: The Asymptotic Distribution of Resources.
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Abstract
In this paper we consider a sequential allocation problem with n individuals. The first individual can consume any amount of some endowment leaving the remaining for the second individual, and so on. Motivated by the limitations associated with the cooperative or non-cooperative solutions we propose a new approach. We establish some axioms that should be satisfied, representativeness, impartiality, etc. The result is a unique asymptotic allocation rule. It is shown for n=2,3,4, and a claim is made for general n. We show that it satisfies a set of desirable properties.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | A Sequential Allocation Problem: The Asymptotic Distribution of Resources |
English Title: | A Sequential Allocation Problem: The Asymptotic Distribution of Resources |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | Sequential allocation rule, River sharing problem, Cooperative and non-cooperative games, Dictator and ultimatum games. |
Subjects: | C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C79 - Other D - Microeconomics > D6 - Welfare Economics > D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D74 - Conflict ; Conflict Resolution ; Alliances ; Revolutions |
Item ID: | 56690 |
Depositing User: | António Miguel Osório-Costa |
Date Deposited: | 18 Jun 2014 23:46 |
Last Modified: | 26 Sep 2019 18:01 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/56690 |