Munich Personal RePEc Archive

Population-Monotonicity of the Nucleolus on a Class of Public Good Problems

Sonmez, Tayfun O. (2014): Population-Monotonicity of the Nucleolus on a Class of Public Good Problems.

[img]
Preview
PDF
MPRA_paper_58248.pdf

Download (4MB) | Preview

Abstract

Sprumont (1990) shows that the Shapley value (Shapley 1957) is population-monotonic (Thomson 1983) on the class of convex games (Shapley 1971). In this paper we study the population-monotonicity of the nucleolus (Schmeidler 1969). We show that the nucleolus is not population-monotonic on the class of convex games. Our main result is that the nucleolus is population-monotonic on a class of public good problems which is formalized in Litilechild and Owen (1973) under the name of airport games. We also provide a recursive formula for the nucleolus of the airport game.

UB_LMU-Logo
MPRA is a RePEc service hosted by
the Munich University Library in Germany.