Muthoo, Abhinay and Shepsle, Kenneth (2007): The Constitutional Choice of Bicameralism. Forthcoming in:
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Abstract
We take a garden-variety instance of distributive politics-- a divide-the-cake stage game -- and explore dynamic extensions in different institutional settings: (i) repeated play of the stage game in a simultaneous-term unicameral legislature; (ii) repeated play in a staggered-term unicameral legislature; and (iii)repeated play in a bicameral setting of one staggered-term and one simultaneous-term legislative chamber. We are then able to entertain decisions taken at "the constitutional moment" regarding which institutional forms to employ.
| Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
|---|---|
| Original Title: | The Constitutional Choice of Bicameralism |
| Language: | English |
| Keywords: | institutions; distributive politics; repeated divide-the-cake games; bicameralism |
| Subjects: | D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior |
| Item ID: | 5825 |
| Depositing User: | Kenneth Shepsle |
| Date Deposited: | 20 Nov 2007 09:45 |
| Last Modified: | 28 Sep 2019 17:51 |
| URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/5825 |
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