A Cost Benefit Analysis of Voting

Cebula, Richard and McGrath, Richard and Paul, Chris (2002): A Cost Benefit Analysis of Voting. Published in: Academy of Economics and Finance Papers and Proceedings , Vol. 30, No. 1 (20 August 2003): pp. 65-68.

Abstract

This study empirically estimates the determinants of aggregate voter participation rates between 1960 and 1996 using instrumental variables. Other things equal, an increase in the public’s dissatisfaction with politicians decreases voter participation, an increase in the highest marginal tax rate increases voter participation, and Watergate had a sustained negative effect on voter participation.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: presidential election year; maximum marginal tax rate; Watergate scandal; public dissatisfaction with government
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior; D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation; H - Public Economics > H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue > H24 - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies; H - Public Economics > H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue > H26 - Tax Evasion and Avoidance

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