Munich Personal RePEc Archive

Incomplete information and R&D organization

Chattopadhyay, Srobonti and Kabiraj, Tarun (2014): Incomplete information and R&D organization.

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The paper studies incentives for cooperative research vis-à-vis non-cooperative research under incomplete information when the R&D outcome is stochastic and continuously distributed with a given mean and a constant variance. We show that the non-cooperative R&D incentive increases with the variance of the R&D outcome. And this result does not depend on the nature of the product market competition.

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