On the Interaction between Player Heterogeneity and Partner Heterogeneity in Strict Nash Networks

Charoensook, Banchongsan (2015): On the Interaction between Player Heterogeneity and Partner Heterogeneity in Strict Nash Networks.

Abstract

This paper brings together analyses of Strict Nash networks under exclusive player heterogeneity assumption and exclusive partner heterogeneity assumption. This is achieved through examining how the interactions between these two assumptions influence important properties of Strict Nash networks. Built upon the findings of Billand et al (2011) and Galleotti et al (2006), which assume exclusive partner hetero- geneity and exclusive player heterogeneity respectively, I provide a proposition that generalizes the results of these two models by stating that: (i) Strict Nash network consists of multiple non-empty components as in Galleotti et al (2006), and (ii) each non-empty component is a branching or Bi network as in Billand et al (2011). This proposition requires that a certain restriction on link formation cost (called Uniform Partner Rankng), which encloses exclusive partner heterogeneity and exclusive player heterogeneity as a specific case, is satisfied. In addition, this paper shows that value heterogeneity plays a relatively less important role in changing the shapes of Strict Nash networks.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Strict Nash Network, Two-way Flow Network, Information Network, Branch- ing Network, Agent Heterogeneity
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D85 - Network Formation and Analysis: Theory

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