Implications of Ownership Identity and Insider's Supermacy on the Economic Performance of the Liste Companies

Yasser, Qaiser Rafique and Mamun, Abdullah Al (2014): Implications of Ownership Identity and Insider's Supermacy on the Economic Performance of the Liste Companies. Published in: Corporate Ownership & Control , Vol. 4, No. 11 (2014): pp. 399-411.

Abstract

We adopt a multi-theoretic approach to investigate a previously unexplored phenomenon in extant literature, namely the differential impact of ownership identity and director dominate shareholding on the performance of emerging market firms. The main research question addressed is, whether the impact of this relationship is conditional on the identity of the block investor. First, the relationship between overall block ownership and firm performance is tested by employing multiple regressions on 500 firm-year observations for the period from 2007 to 2011. Then, the block ownership is classified as the state, individuals, insiders, financial institutions, corporate and foreign investors and the influence of these identities on firm performance is examined. It was found that only the ownership categories such as the government, institutions and foreign ownership have positive influence on the firm performance. The results also indicate that high level of insider ownership also negatively associated with the firm performance. The main contribution of this paper is the examination of the relationship between block ownership and firm performance from the perspective of the identity of investors.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Ownership Structure, Firm Performance, Director Domination
• Subjects: G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance; G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G34 - Mergers ; Acquisitions ; Restructuring ; Corporate Governance

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