Construction Corrupts: Empirical Evidence from a Panel of 42 Countries

P. Kyriacou, Andreas and Muinelo-Gallo, Leonel and Roca-Sagalés, Oriol (2015): Construction Corrupts: Empirical Evidence from a Panel of 42 Countries.

Abstract

The construction sector, whether privately or publically financed, is characterized by potentially large rents and government intervention. Not surprisingly then, both case-study and survey evidence has been provided highlighting the problem of corruption in this sector. In this article, we test the proposition that a bigger construction sector is likely to be inimical to clean government based on a panel of 42 countries over the period 1995 to 2011. We control for a range of potentially counfounding variables and the expectation that corrupt public officials may favor the development of this sector because it increases the volume of rents available to them. Our empirical evidence shows that a larger construction sector will tend to worsen perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Corruption, Construction Sector, Empirical Estimates, Reverse Causality
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D73 - Bureaucracy ; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations ; Corruption; L - Industrial Organization > L7 - Industry Studies: Primary Products and Construction > L74 - Construction

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