Tetsuya, Saito (2007): Military Expenditures of Dictatorial Regimes: A Strategic Theory.
Download (117kB) | Preview
Unlike usual approaches to military expenditures that concentrate on foreign affairs, this paper analyzes a strategic structure for a dictatorialgovernment to plan military expenditures concenrrating on domestic affairs. Then we find two dilemmas: The dictatorial government may spend less on military equipment if they have some destructive devices and then citizens may have relatively larger disposable incomes in exchange for military oppressions; and the dictatorial government increases military expenditures as their economy grows to sap revolutionary interests. Based on these results, I also make some closing discussions.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Military Expenditures of Dictatorial Regimes: A Strategic Theory|
|Keywords:||Strategic military expenditure; dictatorial government; revolutionary pressure; destructive devices; economic growth|
|Subjects:||H - Public Economics > H5 - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies > H56 - National Security and War
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games
|Depositing User:||Tetsuya Saito|
|Date Deposited:||07. Dec 2007 14:35|
|Last Modified:||20. Feb 2013 02:31|
Acemoglu, D. and J. A. Robinson, “Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality and Growth in Historical Perspective,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2000, 115 (4), 1167–1199. and , Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, Cambridge University Press, 2006. Arrow, K. J., “A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare,” Journal of Political Economy, 1950, 58 (4), 328–46. Azam, J.-P., “How to Pay for the Peace? A Theoretical Framework with References to African Countries,” Public Choice, 1995, 83 (1-2), 173–184. Cuaresma, J. C. and G. Reitschuler, “‘Guns or Butter?’ Revisited: Robustness and Nonlinearity Issues in the Defense-Growth Nexus,” Scotish Journal of Political Economy, 2006, 53 (4), 523–541. Engerman, S. L. and K. L. Sokoloff, “The Evolution of Suffrage Institutions in the New World,” Journal of Economic History, 2005, 65 (4), 891–921. Okun, A. M., Equality and Efficiency, the Big Trade-off, Brookings Press, 1975. Roemer, J. E., “Rationalizing Revolutionary Ideology,” Econometrica, 1985, 53 (1), 85–108. Weinstein, J. M., “Resources and the Information Problem in Rebel Recruitment,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2005, 49 (4), 598–624. Yakovlev, P., “Arms Trade, Military Spending, and Economic Growth,” Defence and Peace Economics, 2007, 18 (4), 317–338.