Alcalde, José and RomeroMedina, Antonio (2015): StrategyProof Fair School Placement.

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Abstract
This paper provides an `escape route' from the efficiencyequity tradeoff in the School Choice problem. We achieve our objective by presenting a weak notion of fairness, called τfairness, which is always satisfied by some allocation.
Then, we propose the adoption of the Student Optimal Compensating Exchange mechanism, a procedure that assigns a τfair allocation to each problem.
We further identify a condition on students' preferences guaranteeing incentive compatibility of this mechanism.
Item Type:  MPRA Paper 

Original Title:  StrategyProof Fair School Placement 
Language:  English 
Keywords:  School Choice Problem, Fair Matching, Top Dominance Condition, StrategyProofness 
Subjects:  C  Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7  Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C78  Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory D  Microeconomics > D6  Welfare Economics > D63  Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement I  Health, Education, and Welfare > I2  Education and Research Institutions > I28  Government Policy 
Item ID:  62831 
Depositing User:  Jose Alcalde 
Date Deposited:  14 Mar 2015 12:13 
Last Modified:  29 Sep 2019 20:08 
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URI:  https://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/id/eprint/62831 