Munich Personal RePEc Archive

Strategy-Proof Fair School Placement

Alcalde, José and Romero-Medina, Antonio (2015): Strategy-Proof Fair School Placement.

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Abstract

This paper provides an `escape route' from the efficiency-equity trade-off in the School Choice problem. We achieve our objective by presenting a weak notion of fairness, called τ-fairness, which is always satisfied by some allocation.

Then, we propose the adoption of the Student Optimal Compensating Exchange mechanism, a procedure that assigns a τ-fair allocation to each problem.

We further identify a condition on students' preferences guaranteeing incentive compatibility of this mechanism.

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