Strategic Voting for Noncooperative Environmental Policies in Open Economies

Hattori, Keisuke (2007): Strategic Voting for Noncooperative Environmental Policies in Open Economies.

Abstract

In this paper, we construct a political-economy model of international noncooperative environmental policymaking, and examine the strategic incentives for voters to elect an environmental policymaker in open economies. We show that under several circumstances, citizens have an incentive to deliberately vote for a candidate whose environmental preferences differ from their own. Further, the strategic voting incentives are crucially depend on the environmental policy tools employed by the government, the international market structures, and the degree of product differentiation among firms.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: strategic voting, the race to the bottom, market structure, environmental policy
• Subjects: F - International Economics > F1 - Trade > F18 - Trade and Environment; D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior; D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection

References

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