Munich Personal RePEc Archive

Within-group heterogeneity and civil war

Mizuno, Nobuhiro and Okazawa, Ryosuke (2015): Within-group heterogeneity and civil war.


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This paper provides a bargaining model of conflict in which the government offers a transfer to an opposition group to avoid civil war. Members of the opposition are heterogeneous in income and ideology, and heterogeneity generates disagreement about whether to accept the government's offer. We assume the probability that government's offer avoids conflict increases continuously with the number of opposition group members who agree to accept it. When the within-group heterogeneity is large, the number of members receptive to the government's offer is less responsive to an increase in transfer level. In this situation, the government must raise its transfer substantially to attract support among the opposition. As peace becomes more costly for the government, negotiations are likely to break down.

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